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THE EFFECT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL DECISION
MAKING: BEYOND ROTH AND EASTLAKE
Steven M. Elrod*
The fifth' and fourteenth2 amendments to the United States Constitution
recognize certain fundamental individual interests-broadly categorized as
"life," "liberty," and "property"-as woithy of protection against depriva-
tion by federal, state, and local governments. These amendments, however,
do not state that such a deprivation of interests is always prohibited. Rather,
deprivation may be condoned when accompanied by "due process of law."
Procedural due process3 serves a dual function; it acts as a check on
overzealous governmental administration while concurrently protecting in-
dividuals against unfettered deprivation of their protected interests. Yet,
'due process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with
* Associate, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Tulane University; J.D., Northwestern
University. This Article was sponsored by the Northwestern University School of Law Senior
Research Program. The author wishes to thank Professors Victor G. Rosenblum and Leonard
S. Rubinowitz for their helpful guidance and comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. The fifth amendment provides, in relevant part: "No person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend V.
2. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. See supra notes 1-2. In the American legal system, the due process clause is divided
into two broad concepts: substantive due process and procedural due process. See L. TRma,
AmeRucA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 502 n.4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIE]. Substan-
tive due process involves limitation of the content or scope of various governmental activities.
During the first few decades of the twentieth century, substantive due process involved judicial
protection of railroads, corporations, and other business and economic interests through the
invalidation of state laws regulating the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. Comment, The
Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Per-
sonal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property . .. In Our Economic System," 66 Nw.
U.L. REv. 502, 503 n.5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. As a consequence of the In-
dustrial Revolution, courts tried to shield the expanding free enterprise system from govern-
mental interference. Id. at 503. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (statute
restricting bakers to 60 hour work week invalidated because state police powers could not in-
terfere with individual freedom of contract). Modern courts have abandoned the use of substantive
due process to determine the propriety of economic and business regulations. Courts now limit
use of substantive due process to the protection of interests in privacy, autonomy, and family
relations. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance
limiting occupancy of urban dwellings to members of immediate family unconstitutional); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fourteenth amendment liberty right includes a woman's choice
to have an abortion within certain period following conception).
In contrast, procedural due process concerns the constitutional limits placed upon the pro-
cedures through which governmental decisions affecting individual interests are made and en-
forced. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1502 n.5 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Developments in the Law-Zoning].
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a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."" Accordingly,
the application of the due process clause has become one of the most dif-
ficult and tedious tasks in American constitutional law.
In Board of Regents v. Roth,' the Supreme Court developed an analytical
framework for resolving issues in the procedural due process area. Although
an effective method for resolving procedural due process issues, this
framework is threatened by an emerging doctrine which effectively precludes
the applicability of procedural due process protection in certain areas of
governmental decision making. This doctrine predicates application of pro-
cedural due process on a superficial dichotomy between legislation and ad-
judication. Only those deprivations created by an adjudicative, as opposed
to a legislative, decision making body will be subject to procedural due pro-
cess. This doctrine effectively permits state and local governments to deprive
individuals of fundamental constitutional interests without due process of
law. The emergence of this doctrine and its potentially deleterious ramifica-
tions in the procedural due process area require a reexamination of the
analytical framework developed in Roth.
This Article first traces the evolution of procedural due process from its
origin to its present role in American society.' The primary area of concen-
tration will be the scope of the "property interest" 7 under procedural due
4. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
5. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
6. Procedural due process has acquired a separate identity in criminal law. There, the em-
phasis has been on apprising the defendant of what behavior is illegal. See, e.g., Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (local vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness because
it failed to give adequate notice of what conduct it prohibited); Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971) (local gathering and assembly ordinance void for vagueness). Examination
of due process in criminal cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
7. The rationale behind focusing on the property interest to the exclusion of other in-
dividual interests is that the property interest typically is affected by state and local govern-
ments. For example, states and municipalities historically have exercised control over individual
property interests in real estate through zoning, land-use regulation and real estate assessment
powers. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926) (zoning
power and regulation is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (tax assessment and property valuation are
proper matters for state and local government concern). Moreover, state and local governments
have traditionally engaged in a wide variety of regulatory functions that affect individual pro-
perty interests. For example, education, welfare, unemployment and worker's compensation
programs are typically state administered. Additionally, both state and local governments often
impose sales and income taxes, require adherence to building and health codes, provide public
services and utilities, employ governmental workers, and institute licensing procedures for
numerous functions and activities. For further discussion of how state and local governments
engage in regulatory functions affecting individual property interests, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITITION 113-67 (1977); J. FAIRLIE & C. KNEIR, COUNTY GOVERNMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION 39-77, 221-38, 302-28, 373-87 (1930); D. MENDELKER & D. NETCH, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27-48 (1977); Sandalow, Federal Grants and
the Reform of State and Local Government, in FINANCINo THE METROPOLIS 175-80 (J. Crecine
ed. 1970). In this Article, emphasis on the property interest over other areas of procedural
due process is not to imply that there is any special treatment by the courts of this interest.
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process analysis. Second, this Article will carefully examine the current ap-
proach used by the judiciary in analyzing and applying procedural due pro-
cess. Such an approach looks first to the scope of the interests protected
by the due process clause, and second to the type of procedural safeguards
that must be afforded upon a proper showing of a deprivation. This second
section also will examine the controversial issue of how much deference should
be paid to state and local statutory law and judicial precedent in resolving
due process issues. Third, this Article will focus on the judicial trend toward
creating a dichotomy, for due process purposes, between legislative and
judicial actions. This third section will reveal the problems inherent in this
dichotomy and will propose that the legislative-adjudicative dichotomy not
be considered a separate prong in procedural due process analysis.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Constitutional scholars have expended much effort analyzing the functions
served by procedural due process.' Justice Frankfurter, in his celebrated con-
currence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,' expressed
the notion that the utility of due process is to promote fairness and justice
in resolving issues." ° In Fuentes v. Shevin," Justice Stewart recognized that
certain procedural requirements are necessary to prevent unfair, arbitrary,
and mistaken deprivation of property. 2 Justice Harlan, in Boddie v.
Connecticut,'3 determined that due process rights enable the settling of dif-
ferences in an orderly, predictable manner." While the foregoing theories.
8. For a discussion of the interests served by procedural due process, see Developments
in the Law-Zoning, supra note 3, at 1505. The authors identify three interests: (1) the "effi-
ciency interest" assures that governmental decisions affecting individuals are made correctly
and efficiently; (2) the "representational interest" assures that the person affected by a deci-
sion will be able to argue before the relevant body about application and interpretation of
the substantive rules; and (3) the "dignity interest" assures individual dignity by requiring that
the government explain its actions to those directly affected. Id.
9. 341 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10. According to Justice Frankfurter:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by
which it was reached. . . .No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating
the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72.
11. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12. Id. at 80-81. According to Justice Stewart:
The purpose of the due process right to be heard is not only to ensure abstract
fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantially un-
fair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when
the state seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a private
party.
13. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
14. Id. at 374. According to Justice Harlan, due process, as part of the "system of rules
defining the various rights and duties" of citizens, is a principle feature of an organized society.
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should not be considered exclusive interpretations of the interests served by
procedural due process, they do provide a succinct and authoritative represen-
tation of the interests that the majority of authorities believe due process
protects. I5
Because of the fundamental interests served by procedural due process,
the Supreme Court has had difficulty devising an exact formula to deter-
mine the doctrine's scope and application. Traditionally, the Court used an
imprecise balancing test to ascertain the applicability of procedural due pro-
cess safeguards to a certain set of facts.'I In his concurring opinion in Joint
Anti-Fascist,'7 Justice Frankfurter explained that this balancing test required
that the governmental interest in carrying out certain activities be balanced
against individual interests in freedom from such governmental intrusion.'"
Yet, this balancing process was so often slanted in favor of the government
that the governmental interest almost uniformly would prevail over the in-
dividual interest. '9
The balancing approach traditionally offered little protection for individual
liberty and property interests. Consequently, in the late 1960's and early
1970's, the Supreme Court began to reject this imprecise approach to pro-
cedural due process. Concurrently, the Court laid the groundwork for the
Such a system promotes individual achievement by lessening the anxieties concomitant with
disorganization, and makes social cohesion possible. Id.
15. For additional perspectives on the functions served by procedural due process, see TaME,
supra note 3, at § 10-7; Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance
of Old Friends, 9 H~av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 451-58 (1974); Van Alystyne, Cracks in "The
New Property:" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445, 487 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Van Alystyne].
16. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
894-95 (1961) (to determine the procedures required by due process, the court must consider
both the nature of the governmental action and the private interest affected). See generally
Comment, supra note 3, at 505-06 (under traditional approach of assessing the procedures re-
quired by due process, the individual interest was balanced against the governmental interest).
17. 341 U.S. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. It is important to note the specific language used by Justice Frankfurter in describing
this balancing test because his concurring opinion has been regarded as seminal in early pro-
cedural due process analysis:
Again, it is fair to emphasize that the individual's interest is here to be weighed
against a claim of the greatest of all public interests, that of national security. In
striking the balance the relevant considerations must be fairly, which means coolly,
weighed with due regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary
judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to
observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government.
Id. at 164 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
897 (1961) (applying balancing test to revocation of naval officer's installation access privilege
for his failure to satisfy security requirements; Court upheld revocation and subsequent dismissal
of employee without notice or hearing pursuant to "settled principle" that government employ-
ment was terminable at will of officer in charge); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959)
(government employees can be summarily discharged at any time without a reason).
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establishment of a new, systematic approach." In Goldberg v. Kelly" and
Boddie v. Connecticut,2 the Court paid greater deference to the individual
interest in procedural safeguards such as "prior notice" and "opportunity
to be heard" prior to finding that the governmental deprivation of protected
rights was constitutionally permissible. For instance, although the Court in
Goldberg paid lip service to the traditional balancing approach to procedural
due process,23 it elevated individual interests over governmental interests
throughout the opinion. One example of this approach is the Court's liberal
conceptualization of statutory public welfare benefits. Relying on little prece-
dent or authority, the Court raised welfare entitlements to the level of
a protected property interest.2"
The movement toward abandoning the traditional approach to procedural
due process is evidenced by Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach v. Fami-
ly Finance Corp.2" and the majority opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin. 6 Sniadach
concerned a Wisconsin pre-judgment garnishment scheme which permitted
a creditor to seize a debtor's wages without notice or a hearing. Both the
majority and Justice Harlan agreed that the Wisconsin scheme violated fun-
damental principles of due process.27 Harlan, however, employed a unique
approach; he first determined that the deprivation of property involved was
not de minimus. Only then did he conclude that the notice and hearing pro-
visions of the Wisconsin scheme failed to satisfy due process. 8 In sum,
Harlan placed little emphasis on the balancing of governmental and individual
interests. Instead, if a protected interest (e.g., property) was significantly
20. Although the Court has never expressly stated a reason for this "revolution," one possible
explanation is that the Court was responding to an increased social desire to afford judicial
protection of civil liberties. Cf. Comment, supra note 3, at 503-04 (increased judicial recogni-
tion of individual rights based on greater access to courts and implementation of legal services
for the poor).
21. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. 410 U.S. 371 (1971).
23. The Goldberg Court purported to balance the extent of the individual's loss and his
interest in avoiding that loss with the governmental interest in summary adjudication. 397 U.S.
at 262-63.
24. The Court asserted that "[it may be more realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity'...." Id. at 262 n.8. In his dissent, Justice Black
labeled the majority opinion as a "drastic and dangerous departure" from well-settled prece-
dent. 1d. at 277.
A second example of the Goldberg Court's implicit abandonment of the traditional approach
to procedural due process is demonstrated in the Court's discussion of the applicable remedy.
Although the Court recognized that post-termination hearings served the important governmen-
tal interest of fiscal management, it nevertheless concluded that only a pretermination eviden-
tiary hearing provided the recipient with adequate procedural due process before terminating
welfare benefits. Id. at 264.
25. 395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 342-43.
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deprived, then due process applied notwithstanding the outcome of the
balance."
In Fuentes, the majority of the Court adopted the logical approach used
by Justice Harlan in Sniadach. Fuentes involved a Florida statute that
authorized state agents to summarily seize a person's possessions upon the
ex parte application of anyone who claimed a right to them. The statute
failed to provide for notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Court first
examined the individual property interests at stake. Although the appellant
debtors lacked full title. to the replevied goods, the Court broadly interpreted
the fourteenth amendment's protection of property to include "any signifi-
cant property interest," 3 including the interest in continued possession and
use of the goods.3 After finding appellant's property interest to be pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, the Court ruled that the Florida statute
was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time." Again, the Court effectively discarded the tradi-
tional balancing of interests approach in favor of a simple examination of
whether a fundamental interest had been infringed.
Two weeks after it handed down the Fuentes opinion, the Court, in Board
of Regents v. Roth,3 formally abolished the use of balancing to determine
whether the due process clause initially is applicable.3" After recognizing the
validity and the utility of the approach implicitly adopted in Goldberg, Bod-
die, and Fuentes, the Court observed that the constitutional requirements
of due process should not depend upon "such a narrow balancing process." 3
Consequently, the "new" systematic approach of making a threshold deter-
mination of the existence of a constitutionally cognizable and protected in-
terest was explicitly adopted by the Roth Court.36
In Roth, an assistant political science professor at Wisconsin State Univer-
sity was informed, without explanation, that he would not be rehired. Accord-
ing to a Wisconsin statute in force at the time of respondent Roth's employ-
29. See Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rendleman]. Rendleman considers Harlan's concurrence to be the "in-
tellectual foundation of the new due process."
When the threshold interest and the requirement of due process were established,
it made no difference that the loss was not permanent, that interim relief was possible,
or that notice was received when the property was taken. If a constitutionally
cognizable interest in the use of property was affected, prior notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing were required.
Id. at 535-36.
30. 407 U.S. at 86.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 96. In so doing, the Court quickly disposed of arguments in support of the statute
such as the existence of damages, id. at 81-82, and that "an emergency obviated notice and
a hearing." Id. at 93.
33. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
34. Id. at 570-71.
35. Id. at 570-71 & nn.7-8.
36. Id. at 577.
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ment, a nontenured teacher was not "entitled" to anything beyond his one-
year employment.37 Additionally, the rules promulgated by the Board of
Regents during Roth's employment merely provided that a nontenured teacher
"dismissed" before the end of the term may have some opportunity for
review of the "dismissal." 38 The rules were silent, however, with respect
to decisions not to rehire. Roth argued that the unchallengeable decision
not to rehire him abridged his fourteenth amendment right to procedural
due process. 9 In resolving the case, Justice Stewart, speaking for a five-
person majority, delineated a simple formula for applying the due process
clause."' Stewart concluded that Roth's fourteenth amendment right to pro-
cedural due process had not been violated."
II. THE ROTH PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Justice Stewart's systematic procedural due process formula involves a two-
pronged analysis: (1) Is the individual interest allegedly abridged encompassed
by the fourteenth amendment's protection of life, liberty or property? (2)
If so, what procedures will satisfy the amendment's due process
requirement?"' The first prong essentially determines whether due process
safeguards are warranted. If an individual is not deprived of a recognized
liberty or property interest, then constitutional due process protection is
unnecessary. 3 Conversely, if the interest is protected, then some form of
37. The statute stated that "[a]ll teachers in any state university shall initially be employed
on probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior after
4 years of continuous service in the state university system as a teacher." Wis. STAT. § 37.31(1)
(1967).
38. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567.
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. at 569-71.
41. Id. at 578-79. Stewart reasoned that neither Roth's original employment nor any University
policy or rule gave Roth a right to subsequent employment. Stewart defined a protected pro-
perty interest as "the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."
Id. at 576. Therefore, although Roth might have had a personal interest in being rehired, he
did not have a property interest which would require a hearing. It is ironic that while Roth
is the leading case expanding individual rights under procedural due process, the plaintiff's
due process rights in that case were not found to have been infringed.
For a more elaborate discussion of the Roth decision, particularly with respect to its impact
on the field of education, see Rosenblum, Legal Dimensions of Tenure, in FACULTY TENURE
160 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenblum]. Professor Rosenblum observes that Stewart's opinion
in Roth opened the door to the applicability of empirical research findings in a procedural
due process analysis. Id. at 178.
42. Roth, 408 US. at 570-71. This approach has been enthusiastically received and adopted
in Supreme Court and lower court cases. For recent application of this approach, see Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (failure to afford hearing prior to revocation of passport based
on statutory construction similar to Roth analysis); Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (Roth
test used to determine that administrative procedures for negligent loss of prisoner's property by
guards provides due process); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1277 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff-
tenants had property interests in HUD-insured mortgages under Roth analysis).
43. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569.
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due process protection is required. The unique aspect of this analysis is that
it involves looking "not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest
at stake.""" Provided that the interest at stake merits protection, the second
prong of this two part test entails determination of what "process" is due.
The requirements of due process will vary according to "the importance of
the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings."" 5 At
first glance, the foregoing analysis may appear relatively simple. Subsequent
application of the Roth two prong test, however, has created a great deal
of confusion." Accordingly, further elaboration of the fundamental aspects
of both prongs is necessary.'
Phase I: Is the Interest Involved Protected?
Although the scope of interests shielded by the fourteenth amendment has
greatly widened in the last decade,"' the Court has stated that the range
of protected interests is not infinite. 9 Thus, it is essential to determine which
governmental actions trigger procedural due process protection. Traditional-
ly, the property interest has been the area most affected by governmental
decision making."0 The concept of property steadily expanded until recent
44. Id. at 570-71.
45. Id. at 570 n.8 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)). While a balancing
test has been eliminated from the first prong of this analysis, it plays a central role in deter-
mining what process is due under the second prong. See infra text accompanying notes 107-40.
46. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1978) (student must be given oral or written
notice of charges against him and opportunity to be heard before temporarily suspended from
public school) with Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (no hearing required
for dismissal of medical student by faculty evaluation committee). For further discussion of
judicial application of the Roth test in public school settings, see Note, Procedural Due Pro-
cess and Short Suspensions From the Public Schools: Prologue to Goss v. Lopez, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 364, 370-77 (1975).
47. Significantly, Justice Stewart omitted a third prong: the determination of whether the
deprivation was effected by a legislative or an adjudicative body. The third section of this
Article will discuss the propriety of including analysis of this issue as a de facto third prong
to the Roth test.
48. See Rendleman,supra note 29,at 531-34. The Roth Court, in recognizing the expansive
nature of the interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment, stated:
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among the "[g]reat
[constitutional] concepts ...purposefully left to gather meaning from experience.
... [Tihey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen
who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains
unchanged.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (quoting National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
49. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
50. For a discussion of the relationship of the property interest to state and local govern-
ments, see supra note 7. Of course, governments also should be wary of infringing upon the
life and liberty interests. For many years, the Supreme Court has broadly defined the activities
it considered embraced by the term "liberty." In a frequently cited passage, the Court defined
liberty to include:
[N]ot merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
[Vol. 31:679
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Burger Court decisions effectively curtailed its growth."
Historically, only chattels and real estate were considered "property.""
While such a limitation may have made the property interest easier for courts
to grasp, 3 it significantly restricted the type of cases that could be brought
under the fourteenth amendment." ' Moreover, the courts made little effort
to emphasize the significance of property as a distinct due process interest."
Courts were often hesitant to provide due process protection to property
interests, reasoning that the availability of a subsequent suit for redress ade-
quately protected individuals against wrongful deprivation of their property.5 '
In the 1969 Sniadach case,5" Justice Douglas' majority opinion struggled
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (dictum). For a detailed discussion of the expan-
sion of the liberty interest, see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 Cornell L. Rev.
405 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan]; Comment, supra note 3, at 518-24.
The "life" interest is implicated in capital punishment cases. While the Supreme Court has
concluded that the imposition of the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, the Court
has demanded that the imposition of this penalty must not be arbitrary or capricious. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally
Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CAnt. U.L. REV.
1 (1977) (arguing that the death penalty is wrong in all cases, regardless of the procedures
adopted to ensure that it is not arbitrarily imposed).
51. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980); City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
52. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson,
298 Ill. 394, 399-400, 131 N.E. 645, 647 (1921) (quoting Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill.
64, 77 (1882)). An individual interest in such property was considered a "right," whereas an
interest in intangible property was considered merely a "privilege." See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
(no right or guarantee exists to government employment). See also Van Alystyne, supra note
15, at 446-49 (Supreme Court's rejection of the right-privilege distinction indicated that the
fourteenth amendment did not exempt government from due process limitations when dealing
with government's own employees).
53. See Rendleman, supra note 29, at 543.
54. As Professor Monaghan observed, "[tihe existence, vel non, of 'property' seldom raised
any issue reaching the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth century." Monaghan,
supra note 50, at 434-35.
55. At most, property was considered to be part of the broad "liberty" interest. "As late
as the turn of the last century justices were not yet distinguishing between liberty and property;
in the universes beneath their hats liberty was still the opportunity to acquire property." Id.
at 435 n.189 (quoting Hamilton, Property According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 877 (1932)).
56. See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) ("Where only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process,
if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.");
Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1921) (rights relating to enemy property
seized by President pursuant to wartime powers may be protected by suit following deprivation).
57. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a.discussion of Sniadach,
see supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
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with the narrow definition of property. Although Douglas found the Wiscon-
sin pre-judgment wage garnishment statute at issue to be inherently unfair,"
he was reluctant to resolve the matter by broadly interpreting the property
concept. Instead, Douglas merely distinguished wages as being "a special-
ized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. ' "'
Therefore, garnishment of wages was accorded procedural due process pro-
tection; however, because intangible property such as bank accounts or general
debts were not "necessities," attachment of such intangibles was not accorded
due process protection."0
Conversely, Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach expanded the prop-
erty interest concept. Instead of attempting to place wage garnishments into
a special category, Harlan argued that any deprivation not characterized as
de minimis must be afforded due process safeguards.6 This approach
explicitly covered wage garnishments6" and implicitly included a broad range
of intangible property interests.63
The following year, in Goldberg v. Kelly,6" the Court further expanded
the property concept. In Goldberg, the expectation of financial aid in the
form of welfare assistance was elevated to a property interest.65 The Court
reasoned that although welfare entitlements might not fall within the com-
mon law concept of property,66 it was realistic to regard such benefits as
property rather than gratuities. 7 This marked the first time that the Court
was willing to permit an "expectation" to be within the scope of the four-
58. According to Justice Douglas, the result of such a statute "may, as a practical matter
drive a wage-earning family to the wall." 395 U.S. at 341-42.
59. Id. at 340.
60. Id. at 340-42. See Comment, supra note 3, at 525 & n.94 (citing Termplan, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (Arizona court literally interprets Sniadach
and holds that notice is not required in garnishments of property other than wages)). Some
courts have applied Douglas' opinion literally and refused to extend the prohibition of pre-
judgment attachment to property other than wages. See, e.g., Johnston v. Cunningham, 12
Cal. App. 3d 123, 90 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1970) (attachment of debtor's prune crop did not fall
within the notice requirements of Sniadach). See also Note, Some Implications of Sniadach,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 949-50 (1970) (Sniadach demonstrates that the Court recognizes a
constitutional dichotomy within the due process property concept whereby some types of pro-
perty may be attached without prior notice and a hearing, while others require certain pre-
deprivation safeguards).
61. 395 U.S. at 342-43 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 343.
63. For example, Harlan's approach covers non-de minimis intangible property interests
such as those in welfare entitlements, tenured employment, and goods obtained through condi-
tional sales contracts.
64. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
65. Id. at 262 n.8.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court's reasoning rests in part on recognition of the importance of "property"
in society. "Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the
reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaning-
fully in the life of the community." Id. at 265.
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teenth amendment property interest. Consequently, Goldberg provided the
long-awaited judicial recognition of the "new property" concept. 68
Three 1972 Supreme Court cases broadened the concept of property and
clarified its meaning. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 61 the Court adopted Justice
Harlan's threshold approach developed in his Sniadach concurrence.7" The
Fuentes majority held that the interest in continued possession and use of
goods obtained by an installment sales contract was considered property-
despite the fact that the debtor lacked full legal title to the goods.7" Two
weeks later, the Court attempted to limit due process litigation under a
Goldberg-type expectation/entitlement approach. In Board of Regents v.
Roth," the Court mandated that such interests must constitute a "legitimate
claim of entitlement." 3 To prove a case of "legitimate entitlement," the
claim must stem from sources independent of the Constitution such as state
laws, rules, or even interpersonal understandings."'
The scope of the property interest as redefined by Roth is best understood
68. The term "the new property" is derived from Professor Reich's famous article, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich observed that the increasing growth of "govern-
ment largess" has caused the wealth of more and more Americans to depend upon their rela-
tionship to the government. Consequently, Reich believed that it was necessary to expand the
"institution called property" beyond its traditional, tangible form. Id. at 733, 786-87.
The Goldberg Court quoted a lengthy passage from a second, equally famous article by Pro-
fessor Reich which further exemplified the expanding concept of property:
[Slociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his fran-
chise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union member-
ship, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options;
all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most important of
these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen,
routes for airlines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense,
space, and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security,
whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the
recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)).
69. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For a discussion of Fuentes, see supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
70. 407 U.S. at 90 n.21.
71. Id. at 86-87. The Fuentes Court extended the property concept when it noted that it
is not significant for due process purposes that the property involved be considered a "neces-
sity" for individual survival. See supra text accompanying note 60. According to the Court:
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally. And, under our free-
enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are respected, however
unwise they may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating
due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect
only the ones that, by its own lights, are "necessary."
Id. at 90 (footnote omitted).
72. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
73. Id. at 577. Specifically, Justice Stewart stated that to have a property interest in a benefit,
"a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
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by examining its application in that case and its companion, Perry v.
Sindermann." In Roth, Justice Stewart reasoned that the statutorily created
property interests of the welfare recipients in Goldberg7 6 were analogous to
Roth's interest in continued employment" as manifested by the terms of
his appointment. 8 Therefore, because the terms of Roth's contract made
no provision for renewal of employment after one year, and there was no
state statute creating an interest in continued employment, Roth did not have
a sufficiently significant property interest to fall within the fourteenth
amendment.71
Sindermann also involved the nonrenewal of a teacher's employment con-
tract. As in Roth, Justice Stewart recognized that the mere fact that the
teacher was not rehired did not amount to an unconstitutional loss of
property." In contrast to the teacher in Roth, however, the teacher in Sinder-
mann demonstrated that there was a "mutually explicit understanding" in
his employment contract that gave him a legitimate claim of entitlement."
While the Stewart property interest test clarified the scope of the property
interest, it also created a perplexing problem. Stewart's test requires courts,
in certain instances,82 to make a dual determination. First, the courts must
defer to state law to determine the initial creation or existence of legitimate
claims of entitlement.83 After this initial assessment, courts then must deter-
mine the constitutional significance of the entitlement in terms of the four-
teenth amendment.' On this issue, federal constitutional law is exclusively
controlling.85 The difference between these two steps cannot be emphasized
enough.86 Unfortunately, courts have blurred the line between these two steps
and, consequently, have incorrectly allowed the application of the due pro-
cess clause to hinge in each case on interpretation of state law.
Illustrative of imprudent deference to state law is City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc.'7 There, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a six-person
75. 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (considered along with Roth).
76. For a discussion of Goldberg, see supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
77. For a discussion of Roth, see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
78. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
79. Id.
80. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599.
81. Id. at 601. The Court treated the written contract, with its explicit tenure provision,
as evidence of the respondent's claim to continued employment-absent a showing of sufficient
cause for discharge. Id. For further discussion of the Sinderman case, see Rosenblum, supra
note 41, at 165-67.
82. Such instances include situations where, as in Roth and Sindermann, the entitlement
is alleged to arise out of some arrangement with a state or local government.
83. Justice Stewart explained that property interests "are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
84. Id. at 573.
85. See Monaghan, supra note 50, at 435.
86. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 489-94 (2d ed. 1973).
87. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). For further discussion of the Eastlake case, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 127-32.
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majority, deferred to the Ohio Supreme Court's characterization of a rezon-
ing process as a legislative act."8 Consequently, Burger allowed this
characterization to control the question of whether the due process clause
applied. 9
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the Eastlake majority
for allowing a state court characterization to control a federal constitutional
question. Yet, just eleven days earlier, in his majority opinion in Bishop
v. Wood,9 Stevens had committed the same sin. In Bishop, a city police
officer in Marion, North Carolina was discharged without being afforded
a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cause for his dismissal. The
officer argued that in light of a city ordinance that classified him as a
permanent employee, he had a legitimate claim of entitlement and, hence,
a valid property interest. 2 Although Justice Stevens conceded that the or-
dinance, on its face, could be read as conferring a guaranteed property
interest,93 he further noted that the ordinance also could be construed as
''granting no right to continued employment but merely conditioning an
employee's removal on compliance with certain specified procedures." 9 ' Ac-
cordingly, Justice Stevens ruled that the police officer did not have a valid
property interest sufficient to warrant application of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. In formulating his opinion, Stevens relied on a
district court opinion which had concluded that the ordinance merely meant
that city employees hold their positions "at the will and pleasure of the
City.""' Stevens permitted this lower court opinion to foreclose an indepen-
88. 426 U.S. at 673-74. Article 8, § 3 of the Eastlake City Charter provided, inter alia,
that any changes to existing land uses must be approved by a 55% affirmative vote at a city
general election. To be subject to this referendum procedure, the question must be one within
the scope of legislative power. Id. at 673. The Ohio Supreme Court characterized the Eastlake
City Council's action in rezoning the respondent's property from light industrial to high densi-
ty residential use as being "legislative" in nature. Id. at 670-71.
89. The characterization of a particular action as legislative or administrative is often allowed
to determine whether or not procedural due process protection will be afforded. This issue
will be discussed at length in the third section of this Article.
90. 426 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, "the fact that
a state may give [a procedure] a 'legislative' label should not save an otherwise invalid pro-
cedure." Id. Stevens suggested that when a state's highest court characterized a procedure as
"an arbitrary and unreasonable way of handling a local problem," particular deference was
due that conclusion. Id. He added, however, that "courts ... may well differ in their selection
of the label to apply to this action" and "many state courts would have characterized [this
action] as administrative." Id. at 692.
91. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Bishop was argued on March 1, 1976, and decided on June 10,
1976. Eastlake was also argued on March 1, 1976, but was not decided until June 21, 1976.
92. Id. at 344. Article 2, § 6 of the Personnel Ordinance of the City of Marion provided
that a permanent employee could be discharged only if his work was unsatisfactory over a
period of time, if he failed to perform up to his classification's standard, or if he continually
was negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties. Any discharged employee who so
requested had to be given written notice stating the reason for his discharge. Id.
93. Id. at 345.
94. Id.
95. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 504 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
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dent examination by the Supreme Court of the procedural due process issue.9 6
It is difficult to reconcile Stevens' opinion in Bishop with his dissent in
Eastlake. In the former, he curiously allowed the procedural due process
analysis to play second fiddle to the interpretations of a state court. But,
in Eastlake, he condemned the majority of the Court for doing the same
thing. Perhaps Stevens realized he was theoretically incorrect in Bishop. If
so, the Eastlake dissent represents Stevens' acknowledgment of an earlier
mistake and attempt to rectify the error. If other members of the Court
follow Stevens' initiative, then deference to state law will be limited to deter-
mining the existence of claims of entitlement and not the applicability of
procedural due process.
Judicial Interpretation of the Property Interest
Notwithstanding the state deference problem, the Roth and Sindermann
decisions established a practical method for determining the existence of a
constitutionally protected property interest."7 Perhaps the most straightfor-
96. 426 U.S. at 346.
97. See Rosenblum, supra note 41, at 179. The courts have analyzed the scope of the prop-
erty interest in a variety of factual settings. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme
Court invalidated a Georgia statute which provided for the suspension of the drivers license
of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident unless he posted security to cover the amount
of damages claimed. The Court ruled that a drivers license was a constitutionally protected
property interest, and therefore, the statute was unconstitutional for failing to provide ade-
quate due process protection. Id. at 541-42. The Bell Court reasoned that the continued posses-
sion of a drivers license was "essential in the pursuit of a livelihood." Id. at 539. Interestingly,
the Court observed that the statute would not have violated the fourteenth amendment if it
"barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who do not carry liability insurance. .. "
Id. What the Court intended to accomplish by making this distinction is not clear. One possibility,
which could prove to be significant in later cases, is that property-type expectations that have
not yet been "issued" by the state or local government do not constitute cognizable due pro-
cess interests. Alternatively, the Court merely may have been distinguishing between a statute
which involved all motorists and the Georgia statute which was limited, perhaps arbitrarily,
only to motorists involved in accidents. Id. at 541.
In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), a municipally owned
utility terminated the respondents' service after they failed to pay disputed bills. The respondents
argued that they were being double billed because two sets of gas and electric meters were
serving their premises. Id. at 4-5. Tennessee case law distinguished between utility bills that
were the subject of a "bona fide dispute" and those that were not, permitting public utilities
to terminate service for nonpayment of bills in the latter category. Id. at 9-10. In resolving
the issue of whether the interest in receiving public utility service was constitutionally protected,
Justice Powell stated the general proposition that while the underlying substantive interest was
created by state law, federal constitutional law determined whether it rose to the level of a
legitimate property interest. Id. Yet, like Chief Justice Burger in Eastlake and Justice Stevens
in Bishop, Justice Powell based his determination of whether a protected property interest ex-
isted on a state court decision. Id. In concluding that the provision of utility service merited
due process safeguards, Justice Powell reasoned that although the customer's right to con-
tinued service was conditioned on the payment of charges properly due, such a condition was
irrelevant since the fourteenth amendment's protection of property "has never been interpreted
to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership." Id. at 11.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has held that willful termination of
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ward example of a property interest is ownership of land. Yet, an extremely
important proposition that, unfortunately, often is overlooked is that not
all governmental actions affecting individual land ownership result in due
process violations. While the imposition of a special assessment or zoning
regulation may work some hardship on the property owner, such acts never-
theless will not wholly deprive him of the substantial enjoyment and use
of his property. In such instances, courts may hesitate to conclude that a
deprivation of property has occurred. 9
Conversely, authority exists for the proposition that the unrestricted use
of property is a right that may be protected even from temporary
deprivation.9 According to this view, a deprivation occurs "when the free
use and enjoyment of the .. . [property] or the power to dispose of it at
will is affected."' 0 These cases are most commonly distinguished through
electric service by a privately owned utility does not fall within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, regardless of whether the company is subject to extensive state regulation. Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), reaffirmed the well-settled rule that there
is a "dichotomy between deprivation by the state, [activity] subject to scrutiny under the four-
teenth amendment, and private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful, against which
the fourteenth amendment offers no shield." Id. at 349 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948)).
In Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1980), a county supervisor of assessments
alleged that he received an inadequate hearing after he was not reappointed to a second four-
year term. An Illinois statute, in effect when the plaintiff assumed his post, provided that
in counties not having an elected board of assessors, the office of supervisor of assessments
was to be filled by appointment by the county board for a four-year term. ILL. RaV. STAT.
ch. 120 § 484(a) (1980). The statute also required the board to notify the incumbent of their
decision not to reappoint him and, upon request, to grant him a public hearing to review this
decision. Id. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Illinois law as not conferring upon the plain-
tiff a property interest in continued employment because it only guaranteed him a four-year
term. According to the court, "[t]he statute in no way intimates that an incumbent is granted
tenure or has any entitlement to further employment." 644 F.2d at 1214. The court further
noted that the statute's provision of various procedural safeguards did not elevate the plain-
tiff's interest to a property interest mandating fourteenth amendment protection. Id. Rather,
the purpose of the hearing was to give the incumbent an opportunity to preserve his reputa-
tion, not his job. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiff's mere subjective anticipation
of reappointment was not protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
98. In Eastlake, for example, where plaintiff's rezoning request had been denied, the ma-
jority supported its conclusion that the plaintiff did not merit due process protection because
neither his land use rights nor the value of his land had been significantly affected. 426 U.S.
at 679 n.13.
99. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (a taking of property occurs when
government creates an easement for low-flying air traffic); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84 (1962) (reaffirms Causby rule); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 327 (1922) (a taking of property occurs by regular firing of cannon over owner's
property).
100. Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702, aff'd, 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
See also Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) (law allowing attachment of realty without prior notice
or hearing unconstitutionally restricted owner's ability to sell or mortgage the property at full
value).
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examination of the nature or degree of the deprivation on the land owner.
The general rule is that the more onerous the deprivation, the more likely
such deprivation will trigger application of due process protections.'",
The case of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center"0 2 illustrates
the reluctance of the Supreme Court to further expand the scope of the prop-
erty interest. In O'Bannon, a seven-justice majority held that nursing home
residents had no constitutionally protected property interest in the home's
continued participation in the Medicaid program. 03 The Court recognized
that the ability of many residents to live in the home was contingent upon
the nursing center's continued certification status. The Court reasoned,
however, that because residents were obligated to pay for use of the home
regardless of the home's certification status, they were only indirect
beneficiaries of the center's participation in the Medicaid program.',0 As such,
nursing center residents had no right to a hearing before the home was decer-
tified for failing to meet certain government health standards.
The O'Bannon opinion demonstrates that the Burger Court favors a nar-
row construction of the due process proprerty interest. Moreover, the Court's
direct-indirect effect distinction in O'Bannon has limited the ability of lower
courts to recognize some new property interests.' 5 Consequently, to protect
certain interests, courts have read O'Bannon narrowly'" or identified these
interests with the due process right to liberty.' 7 To be sure, the Roth-
Sindermann property interest criteria still constitute the applicable standard,
but the O'Bannon decision demonstrates that due process property rights
will be narrowly construed.
101. See 8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.44, at 101-03 (3d ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as E. MCQUtLLIN]. One commentator noted that generally, four categories
of property entitlements give rise to procedural due process requirements: (1) expectations of
the free use and enjoyment of land; (2) entitlements to the economic value of the land itself;
(3) expectations that the type of neighborhood will not change suddenly; and (4) expectations
that zoning patterns will evolve gradually, not suddenly. See Developments in the Law-Zoning,
supra note 3, at 1523.
102. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
103. Id. at 786.
104. Id. at 787-88.
105. See, e.g., Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982) (loss of customers
due to city's entering into waste collection business did not deprive plaintiff collector of pro-
perty because adverse effect merely incidental to valid governmental action); Dialysis Centers
Ltd. v. Schweiker, 657 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1981) (competition for patients engendered by Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services approval of federally-subsidized program at medical facility
did not constitute deprivation of property of nearby facility because patients directly benefited
from program); Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (taxpayers' expectation that
public park would remain free of building construction too remote and insignificant to con-
stitute property right).
106. See, e.g,, Spivey v. Barry, 665 F.2d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (since O'Bannon did
not hold that entitlements based on location of government-run health service never gave rise
to a due process hearing, this issue may be litigated).
107. Yaretsky v. Blum, 629 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1980) (patients' property interest affected
when moved to facility providing lower level of state-subsidized health care, but only liberty
interest affected when move to unit providing higher level of care was denied).
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Phase II: What Process is Due?
Once the threshold question of Justice Stewart's two prong test has been
answered affirmatively (i.e., the Court has established that a constitutional-
ly cognizable liberty or property interest has been abridged), it then must
be determined what procedural safeguards the plaintiff is constitutionally
entitled to receive.' 8 The Court has adopted an entirely separate set of factors
for conducting this second phase of the Roth analysis.'0 9 Although the Court
abandoned a balancing approach for determining the existence of a valid
protected interest in Phase I, balancing is a crucial element in Phase II. More
importantly, while the Court was willing to defer to state and local law in
ascertaining the existence of a protected liberty or property interest," ' strict
adherence to federal constitutional law has been determined necessary in ex-
amining what process is due."'
The Court has stated that due process is a flexible concept and mandates
such procedural safeguards as the particular situation requires." 2 Accordingly,
in Mathews v. EIdridge,"3 the Court delineated a framework, in the form
of a balancing test, for analyzing the adequacy of due process protections
accompanying the deprivation of a protected interest. The Court stated that
identification of the specific dictates of due process depends upon the balanc-
ing of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
The Mathews balancing test has become the standard analysis for determin-
ing what process is due under the second prong of Roth.
In Mathews, a social security recipient had been notified that his disability
benefits would be terminated in accordance with elaborate administrative pro-
108. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.8. Although Justice Stewart made it clear that the "what pro-
cess is due" question is an important part of his two-step analysis, the facts of Roth did not
permit him to adequately examine the specific elements of this second phase because the Court
determined that the respondent had not been deprived of a liberty or property interest. Thus,
no process was due in that case. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Roth.
109. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at §§ 10-12.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
111. See TaIE, supra note 3, at §§ 10-12.
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481.(1972).
113. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
114. Id. at 335. Cf. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus For Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
Cm. L. REV. 28 (1976) (Mathews Court's formulation of due process standards erroneously
emphasized questions of technique, rather than due process values) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw].
For a recent application of the Mathews balancing test, see United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980).
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cedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW). ' Dissatisfied with the established procedures, the recipient filed
suit claiming that his due process property rights had been abridged. '" Before
the case reached the Supreme Court, lower courts had concluded that despite
the elaborate character of the HEW administrative procedures, due process
had not been satisfied."' The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the ad-
ministrative burden on the government agency if a pretermination hearing
was required outweighed any possible injury to the interests of the disability
benefit recipient.'
By definition, the second prong of the Roth analysis requires a determina-
tion of what procedural safeguards are mandated by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution." 9 Thus, it should be in-
disputable that in determining whether a specific procedure comports with
due process, federal constitutional law should be exclusively controlling. Yet,
the Supreme Court has twice failed to adhere to this ostensibly mandatory
precept.
In his opinion for the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy,' 0 Justice Rehnquist
set forth an analysis that effectively would give local governmental units
unfettered discretion in determining the type of process that is due subse-
quent to their deprivation of an individual's protected interest. Arnett in-
115. The sequence of procedures for both acceptance and termination of social security benefits
is contained in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-.995 (1982). For a complete and detailed discussion of
these administrative procedures, see Mashaw, supra note 114, at 31-33.
116. 424 U.S. at 324-25. In light of Goldberg and its progeny, the Court had no trouble
concluding that the individual interest in continued receipt of statutorily created benefits such
as social security payments is a constitutionally protected property interest. Id. at 332.
117. Specifically, the district court ruled that the recipient must be afforded a prior eviden-
tiary hearing before termination of his disability payments. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 520, 527-28 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd per curium, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
118. Id. at 347-49. The Court distinguished Goldberg by reasoning that while the disabled
worker can subsist on welfare payments until his case is heard, the welfare recipient has no
further recourse once his benefits are suspended. Consequently, a pretermination hearing is
necessary only in the latter circumstance. Id. at 343. Additionally, the Mathews Court noted
that the disabled worker has access to both private resources (such as charitable contributions)
and governmental aid (such as welfare benefits) in the event that the termination of his disability
benefits reduces his income below the subsistence level. Id. at 342.
The Seventh Circuit recently applied the Mathews balancing test in Labor Party v. Oremus,
619 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1980). Oremus concerned the Illinois village of Bridgeview's revocation
of the plaintiffs' solicitation permits, thereby preventing them from advocating their views in
the village. Under the first step of the Mathews test, the court determined that the permits
might be considered property because they "allowed plaintiffs to exercise a privilege which
[the village] led them to believe was available." Id. at 689. Applying the Mathews balancing
test, the Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that the town officials' substantial interest in
a safe and efficient traffic system outweighed the plaintiffs' interests in solicitation. Id. at 690.
The court further noted that negotiations with town officials, resulting in a conditional re-
issuance of permits, had provided plaintiffs with adequate procedural protection. Id.
119. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
120. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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volved a federal civil servant employed by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity who was discharged for publicly accusing his superiors of bribery.
The statute that created the employee's job contained explicit removal pro-
cedures. These procedures afforded discharged employees various due pro-
cess protections, 2 ' although a trial-type hearing before an impartial agency
official was not permitted. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the employee's due
process claim and held that the statutory procedures adequately satisfied due
process. The Justice reasoned that where the individual's substantive right
is statutorily derived, the individual also must be bound by any limitations
on procedural safeguards inherent in the statute.' 2 Justice Powell, in a con-
curring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, criticized the plurality's "take
the bitter with the sweet" approach.'23 According to Powell, Justice Rehn-
quist misconceived the origin of the right to procedural due process. This
right is derived from constitutional mandate and not legislative largess. Ac-
cordingly, "[w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer a property in-
terest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the depriva-
tion of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards.""'2  Justice Powell was justifiably concerned. Under a strict in-
terpretation of Justice Rehnquist's opinion, states would be able to circum-
vent the procedural mandate of the fourteenth amendment merely by in-
tegrating minimal procedural safeguards into statutes that create property
interests. 2
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,'26 Chief Justice Burger
also failed to exclusively follow federal constitutional law in determining the
appropriate process that should be provided by a municipal government once
it has deprived an individual of a property interest.'27 The respondent in
121. 5 U.S.C. § 7503(b) (1976). In relevant part, the statute provided:
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension without
pay is sought is entitled to know the reasons for his removal in writing and to-
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with affidavits; and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date. Examination
of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided in the discretion
of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay.
Id.
122. 416 U.S. at 153-54.
123. The two justices concurred in the result only. Id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring). After
applying the Mathews balancing test, the justices concluded that the government's interest in
being able to act expeditiously to remove an unsatisfactory employee outweighed the employee's
interest in a prior evidentiary hearing. Id. at 167-70.
124. Id. at 167.
125. Although Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the result, they disapproved of
Justice Rehnquist's approach. Justices White, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan disagreed with
both the result and the Rehnquist approach.
126. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
127. It is interesting to note that in a footnote, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the plaintiff
in Eastlake may not have been deprived of a property interest at all; thus, due process analysis
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Eastlake, having been denied a rezoning request in a statutorily mandated
referendum vote, claimed that he had been deprived of a property interest
by a local governmental unit without being afforded adequate procedural
safeguards. Specifically, the respondent argued that Eastlake's referendum
requirement for all zoning changes' 8 lacked proper standards to guide voter
decisions; consequently, the referendum requirement permitted the depriva-
tion of property through arbitrary and capricious exercise of the police
power. 29
In rejecting this claim, the Chief Justice concluded that the respondent
had received adequate due process protection through the referendum re-
quirement because the power to make zoning decisions was properly reserved
to the people of Eastlake under the Ohio Constitution. 3 ' It is difficult to
rationalize Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that adequate due process existed,
for as Justice Powell observed in a dissenting opinion, "[the Eastlake referen-
dum] procedure, affording no realistic opportunity for the affected person
to be heard, even by the electorate, is fundamentally unfair."'' The Chief
Justice focused on the validity, under the Ohio Constitution, of the referen-
dum procedure.' Curiously, little emphasis was placed on the fact that at
least two Supreme Court decisions, interpreting federal constitutional law,
had found popular decision making to be an inadequate provision of pro-
cedural due process.' 33
would not have been triggered. Id. at 679 n. 13. However, Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissenting opinion that protected interests indeed may have been implicated. Id. at 681 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Rather than resolve whether a constitutionally protected property interest was
involved in this particlular case, the Court focused on the plaintiff's challenge to the referen-
dum process of initiating zoning changes in general. Having found that this process was not
per se unreasonable, the Court reversed the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court and remanded
the case for a determination of whether utilization of this process was reasonable in this par-
ticular situation. Id. at 679. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that the Court believed
that all referenda impacting property interests were per se reasonable under the fourteenth
amendment.
128. See supra note 87.
129. 428 U.S. at 671-72.
130. Id. at 670-71 n.l.
131. Id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell noted further that Eastlake's " 'spot' referendum
technique appears to open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to bypass nor-
mal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights." Id.
132. Id. at 672.
133. In Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), a city ordinance provided that
a "building line" beyond which owners of property abutting the street were not allowed to
build would be established by a two-thirds vote of property owners on a particular street. The
ordinance was challenged by a property owner who was effectively prevented from building
a house on a corner of his lot. Id. at 141-42. The Eubank Court invalidated the ordinance
on grounds that it did not establish a standard by which the power given to the property owners
was to be governed. Id. at 143-44.
Similarly, in Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), the Court
struck down a Seattle ordinance that conditioned permission to build a philanthropic home
on the approval of two-thirds of the property owners within a 400 foot.radius of the proposed
site. The Court held that imposition of such arbitrary power in the hands of neighbors was
"incompatible with the due process clause." Id. at 122.
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There exists a line of authority supporting the use of referendum power
in certain zoning decisions. According to this authority, due process re-
quirements are satisfied by the political process. "' Yet, the problems inherent
in this rationale are many, especially when examined in light of the interests
and functions served by procedural due process.'3
It is inconceivable that the average voter has the insight, knowledge, and
capabilities necessary to resolve finally and efficiently complicated zoning
decisions. It is doubtful that the electorate, many of whom are land owners,
and all of whom have some interest in the development of the community,
will be able to effectively prevent the occurrence of an unfair, arbitrary or
mistaken deprivation'3 6 of another individual's property interest. Consider,
for example, the gas station hypothetical mentioned by Justice Stevens in
his dissenting opinion in Eastlake.'37 As Stevens observed, it would be absurd
to use a city-wide referendum to decide whether a service station could be
operated on a particular corner in Cleveland.' 38 Indeed, zoning decisions en-
tail study of a great deal of analytical data. Such a gas station might be
incompatible with the surrounding land use and thereby create a nuisance,
endanger the health of nearby residents, create aesthetic or environmental
problems in the neighborhood, or sharply decrease the resale value of sur-
rounding real estate. On the other hand, such a gas station might be advan-
tageous to the economic, commercial, and industrial growth of the surround-
ing neighborhood.
These considerations are all extremely relevant in any zoning decision. In
a large municipality, or even in a city with a population of 20,000 (such
as Eastlake in 1975), it is unrealistic to assume that these considerations will
be properly weighed, if at all, through the "debate and persuasion possible
in the political arena."' 39 As one prominent zoning expert observed, "[z]on-
ing does itself a disservice when it goes beyond the catholic role of [pro-
cedural fairness]."'' 0 Consequently, it is difficult for the referendum pro-
cedure to provide the procedural due process functions of ensuring fairness,
134. See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d
291, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1970) (city-wide referendum which nullified a zoning amendment and
effectively precluded low-income housing project was not a denial of procedural due process);
Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 516, 253 P. 932, 936 (1927) (proposed zoning by referen-
dum to block chicken farms from city limits not prohibited by state constitution). See also
Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CA.F. L. REv. 74, 75 (1976)
(California courts have upheld the use of the referendum to challenge zoning decisions, but
have not been as approving of the local initiative process). See generally Glenn, State Law
Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments,
51 S. CAL. L. REv. 265 (1978) (analysis of state decisions on constitutionality of initiative and
referendum).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
136. See supra note 12.
137. 426 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Forest City Enters., Inc. v. City
of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 200, 324 N.E.2d 740, 749 (1975) (Stern, J., concurring)).
138. 426 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Dwyer, 200 Cal. 505, 516, 253 P. 932, 936 (1927).
140. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONIO GAM 136 (1966).
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order, predictability, efficiency, and justice. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger
permitted this federal constitutional proposition to be undermined by a cur-
sory examination of the delegation of power procedure under Ohio's
Constitution.
III. TiH TRIPARTITE PANOPLY OF DuE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
To fully understand what procedures are "due," it is necessary to examine
cases that have dealt with this issue. Generally, the case law can be divided
into three broad and overlapping categories which, together, comprise the
full measure of procedural due process protections: (1) opportunity to be
heard, (2) notice, and (3) fair hearing.
Opportunity To Be Heard
The requirement that a hearing be provided as an element of procedural
due process is deeply embedded in American jurisprudence."' More recent-
ly, the Court has recognized that there is a presumption that the constitu-
tional right to due process includes, as a "root requirement," the right to
be heard.' 2 Although the concept of a hearing usually connotes some type
of formal appearance before an official tribunal, the kind of hearing re-
quired may vary significantly from case to case. In the 1908 case of Londoner
v. City and County of Denver,'"3 the Court recognized that as long as an
individual is provided an opportunity to present arguments and support these
arguments with proof, the hearing may be constitutionally adequate.'"
Goss v. Lopez'45 illustrates the flexibility of the hearing requirement. There,
the Supreme Court ruled that before suspending a student for misconduct,
the student must be given some explanation of the charges against him. A
formal hearing was not necessary because a conference between the
disciplinarian and the student immediately following the alleged misbehavior
usually was sufficient to protect the student's rights.'"6 Similarly, in Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,' 7 the Court held that by pro-
viding customers with the opportunity to present billing complaints to a
designated employee before termination of service, a public utility satisfied
due process.'' Moreover, in Parham v. J.R.,' 9 the Court stated that a for-
mal adversary hearing was not required to institutionalize a child for mental
141. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 419 (1897) ("by denying the right to be heard
to the defendant, what plainer illustration could there be of taking property of one and giving
it to another without . . . due process of law...").
142. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
143. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
144. Id. at 386.
145. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
146. Id. at 581-82.
147. 436 U.S. 1 (1978). See supra note 97.
148. Id. at 16.
149. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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health care. Rather, due process merely necessitated that a personal inter-
view by a "neutral fact finder" be conducted with the child.'
The significance of the foregoing decisions is that under the Mathews
balancing test,'"' the Court has the discretion to mold the form of the hear-
ing to fit the particular facts of each case. Therefore, a "hearing" could
range from an appearance before the tax appeals board to a brief conference
with a teacher or an opportunity to submit written complaints.
Another troublesome issue concerning the hearing requirement is when the
procedure must take place. In establishing strict standards in this area, the
Warren Court suggested that provision of an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time""'5 meant that the hearing must be conducted before a
deprivation has occurred. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' 5 the Court
invalidated a state law allowing wage garnishment without prior notice or
a hearing. The Court noted that the withholding of wages might create un-
due hardship on a garnishee's family-especially if the garnishment was
wrongful.' 54 By the same reasoning, the Warren Court, in Goldberg v. Kel-
ly, held that due process required a hearing to be held before the govern-
ment could terminate welfare benefits because these payments provided the
sole means of subsistence for most recipients.'" Two years later, in Fuentes
v. Shevin,'" the Court extended the pre-deprivation hearing requirement to
seizure of household goods purchased under an installment sales contract.
Thus, despite the fact that the Court had hinted that there may exist "ex-
traordinary situations""' in which the requirement possibly might be relax-
ed, due process generally seemed to demand a hearing before individual pro-
perty rights could be affected.
The Warren Court's position on this issue has since been qualified in a
number of ways. Two years after Fuentes, the Court, in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 58 upheld a Louisiana procedure by which a judge could permit
a creditor to sequester private property before holding a hearing.'" Although
Mitchell did not involve an "extraordinary situation," ' the majority reached
its decision by balancing the interests of both parties'' and concluded that
150. Id. at 607.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
152. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
153. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
154. Id. at 341-42.
155. 397 U.S. at 264.
156. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
157. According to the Fuentes Court, an "extraordinary situation" exists when: "a) a seizure
of property is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental or public interest; b) prompt
action is required; and c) a government official is responsible for authorizing the seizure pur-
suant to a narrowly drawn statute." Id. at 91.
158. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The Mitchell Court split five to four.
159. Id. at 610.
160. See supra note 157.
161. The Court explicitly stated that in such cases the interests of both the seller and the
buyer had to be considered. 416 U.S. at 604. For example, the interests of a seller with a
vendor's lien include the fear that the buyer will damage, destroy, or dispose of the property
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the statute provided adequate safeguards to protect the debtor.' 2 Among
other provisions, the Louisiana statute entitled the debtor to a hearing im-
mediately after the property deprivation.' 63 The following year, in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,'16 the Court invalidated a Georgia
garnishment statute after consideration of the debtor safeguard criteria in
the Mitchell statute.' 6 The majority emphasized the fact that the Georgia
statute did not even require an "early hearing,"'' 6 6 let alone one immediate-
ly following the garnishment. While the North Georgia case demonstrated
that the Supreme Court still disapproved of such pro-creditor statutes, it
also indicated that the days of strict pre-deprivation hearing requirements
were gone.
Indeed, in the 1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 17 the Burger Court firmly
established its disavowal of the Warren Court's prior hearing stance. Writing
for a six-justice majority, Justice Powell went to great lengths to distinguish
the welfare benefits in Goldberg from the disability payments in Mathews
in an attempt to explain why the termination of the latter did not require
a pre-deprivation hearing.' 68 In so doing, the Court announced its three-
part balancing test'6 9 effectively incorporating the Mitchell analysis.' 70 Since
Mathews, the Supreme Court has applied this test to a number of different
factual settings and consistently rejected pre-deprivation hearing claims.' 7'
In contrast to the position of the Warren Court, the Burger Court's prior
hearing stance seems to depend largely on "the availability of some oppor-
tunity subsequent to the initial taking for a determination of rights and
liabilities." 172
while the action is pending. Id. at 606.
162. The Court noted that the statute provided four safeguards for the debtor: first, it re-
quired the creditor to allege specific facts, not conclusory statements, for the writ to issue;
second, the creditor had to make his showing before a judge, as opposed to a lesser court
official; third, the procedure provided for an immediate post-deprivation hearing and dissolu-
tion of the writ if the creditor failed to establish grounds for its issuance; and lastly, the debtor
was entitled to damages and attorney fees upon dissolution of the writ. Id. at 616-18.
163. Id.
164. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
165. Id. at 607.
166. Id.
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
168. Id. at 340-43. See supra text accompanying note 155.
169. Id. at 335. See supra text accompanying note 114. In parts one and three, the Mathews
test elaborates on the balancing of interests first mentioned in Mitchell. See supra text accom-
panying note 161. Part two of the Mathews test impliedly includes Mitchell's debtor safeguards
analysis. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (constitutional to suspend driver's
license for 90 aays without pre-deprivation hearing for refusing to take breath-analysis test);
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1978) (pre-deprivation hearing unnecessary if government
reduces social security payments to recoup previous overpayment); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105 (1977) (Illinois law allowing suspension of driver's license without prior hearing is constitu-
tional because the property interest involved did not outweigh the administrative burdens of
holding a hearing).
172. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 540, 541 (1981).
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Notice
The Court has recognized that the due process hearing requirement is
"meaningless without notice."' 73 Consequently, notice has been considered
a crucial component of procedural due process. Ostensibly, the purpose of
notice is to apprise the affected individual of an impending hearing regard-
ing his protected interest, thereby giving him a chance to adequately prepare
his case.' 4 However, notice also serves the practical function of alerting in-
dividuals of a forthcoming deprivation of their property. For example, when
a local government levies special assessments against property specially
benefited by certain public improvements, courts have uniformly held that
the government must provide all potentially affected individuals with some
form of prior notice. 5
To fulfill the foregoing functions, courts have required that notice be
reasonably calculated to inform affected individuals of the opportunity to
present their objections.'' Moreover, such notice must reasonably convey
the necessary information and provide adequate time for interested persons
to appear.' "
In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,' the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to apply these general principles to the termination of
municipal services.' The Court ruled that in such instances notice must
be calculated to advise customers of the availability of procedures for pro-
testing proposed terminations of service. The Court noted, however, that
notice procedures developed by a utility "may be entirely adequate" in
173. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).
174. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
486-87 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
175. See, e.g., Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (tax-
payer upon whom special assessment is levied "must have notice, either personal, by publica-
tion, or by a law fixing the time and place of the hearing"); Cowan Inv. Corp. v. City of
Florence, 11 F. Supp. 973, 975 (N.D. Ala. 1935) (notice to property owners of amount of
tax assessed against each parcel of property is "necessary to the validity of an assessment");
Tramel v. City of Dallas, 560 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (notice and hearing regarding
tax assessments for street widening required before assessments become permanently fixed).
See also MCQUI.LIN, supra note 101, at §§ 38.98-.100 (property owners must be given notice
and opportunity to contest impending special tax assessment). For a discussion of the general
sufficiency of the notice in special taxation and local assessment cases, see supra McQUILIN,
note 101, at § 38.101. For a discussion of sufficiency of notice in the municipal zoning and
land use area, see Kahn, In Accordance With A Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process
and Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1038-41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Kahn].
176. This requirement emanates from the following oft-quoted passage in Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950):
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an op-
portunity to present their objections.
Id. at 314 (citations omitted),
177. Id.
178. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
179. See supra note 97 for a discussion of Memphis.
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meeting the notice standards,' especially if such procedures included a detail-
ed list of personnel available to respond to customer complaints concerning
their bills.' 81
Fair Hearing
To comply with the Court's mandate that hearings be conducted in "a
meaningful manner,"' 82 hearings must be administered in a responsible, non-
partisan fashion.' 83 Yet, because due process is flexible and must adapt to
a variety of situations,'84 it is often difficult to predict exactly what type
of hearing is necessary.' 85 Perhaps the most authoritative source regarding
the scope of the due process hearing requirement is Judge Friendly's article
entitled Some Kind of Hearing. '86 Therein, Judge Friendly delineated and
ranked eleven different elements which, under varying circumstances, have
been determined as necessary for a fair hearing.' 87 Judge Friendly's analysis
180. 436 U.S. at 15 n.16.
181. Specifically, the notice procedure at issue in Memphis concerned the following state-
ment made to all customers: "Credit Counselors are available to clear up any questions, discuss
disputed bills or to make any needed adjustments. There are supervisors and other manage-
ment personnel available if you are not satisfied with the answers or solutions given by the
Credit Counselors." Id.
182. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
183. See Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 48, 93 (1976) ("Due process means that an individual has a realistic
and not just theoretical opportunity to have his claim decided by an impartial forum and not
to be subjected to a private or bureaucratic will which he is powerless to contest.").
184. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
185. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-72 (1974) (prison disciplinary hearing
requires notice, opportunity to present evidence, and time to call witnesses unless unduly
hazardous; confrontation and cross-examination are at warden's discretion; prison must supply
written statement of reasons for discipline; prison not required to supply counsel for inmate);
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-90 (parole revocation hearing must include notice, op-
portunity to cross-examine and confront witnesses unless risk of danger too great, and infor-
mal statement of reasons given by impartial decision maker); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652
F.2d 146, 172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (where Federal Medicare program participants are denied
statutory benefits, claimants must have access to evidence forming basis of denial, opportunity
to present written or oral evidence, opportunity to interview witnesses, and meaningful ex-
planation of reasons for denial); Kletschka v. Le Sueur County Bd. of Comm'rs, 277 N.W.2d
404, 405 (Minn. 1979) (landowners requesting conditional use permit at zoning proceeding have
a right to reasonable notice of hearing and opportunity to be heard, but do not have right
to cross-examination because such proceedings are not conducted under oath).
186. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
187. Judge Friendly listed the 11 elements in the following order:
(1) an unbiased tribunal (2) notice of the proposed action and grounds asserted
for it (3) an opportunity to present arguments why the proposed action should
not be taken (4) the right to call witnesses (5) knowledge of the evidence against
one (6) decisions based only on evidence presented (7) the right to counsel (8)
the making of a record (9) statement of reasons for the government's position
(10) public attendance (11) judicial review.
Id. at 1279-95.
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revolves around the same balancing test prescribed by the Supreme Court
in Prong II of the Roth analysis.' 8 While it is not necessary to dwell on
all eleven elements noted in Judge Friendly's article,' 9 at least one element,
an impartial and unbiased tribunal, merits further examination.
The Supreme Court often has stressed that a "biased decision maker is
constitutionally unacceptable.""'9 In Withrow v. Larkin, 9 ' the Court iden-
tified two situations in which the probability of actual bias on the part of
the decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable:' 92 (1) where
the adjudicator has a pecuniary stake in the controversy's resolution;' 93 and
(2) where the adjudicator has been criticized by the party before him.' 9
A revolutionary doctrine has originated in the State of Washington re-
quiring the "appearance of fairness" in governmental processes. First enun-
ciated in the 1969 case of Smith v. Skagit County,'" the major tenet of
the doctrine is that the right of an opportunity to be heard "imports a
reasonable expectation of being heeded." 9 6 In Fleming v. City of Tacoma,'"
the Washington court recognized that an important aspect of the "fairness
doctrine" concerns the motives of the persons involved in conducting the
hearing.' 8 In Fleming, a citizen challenged a local rezoning amendment on
grounds that one of the members of the council voting in favor of the amend-
ment allegedly had a conflict of interest. The alleged conflict centered around
the fact that less than forty-eight hours after the vote on the rezoning ap-
plication, a councilman became employed by the successful proponents of
the amendment. " The court ruled that the inference of impropriety on the
188. According to Judge Friendly, the required degree of procedural safeguards varies directly
with the importance of the private interest affected and the need for the usefulness of the
particular safeguard in the given circumstances and inversely with the burden and any other
adverse consequences of affording the safeguards. Id. at 1278. See supra notes 113-14 and
accompanying text.
189. See also Kahn, supra note 175, at 1041-44 (to determine the fairness of the hearing,
Kahn examines the nature and conduct of the proceeding, the right to counsel, use of ex parte
evidence, and the presentation of arguments); Comment, Land Use and Due Process-An Ex-
amination of Current Federal and State Procedures, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 846 (1978) (discusses
federal and state land use regulations in relation to Friendly's 11 elements); Developments in
the Law-Zoning, supra note 3, at 1526 (a fair hearing requires that a decision maker be im-
partial and have standards to guide his judgment).
190. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79
(1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 522 (1927).
191. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
192. Id. at 47.
193. Id. (referring to Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973)).
194. Id. (referring to Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-03 (1974)).
195. 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). For further discussion of the Smith case, see
Comment, Public Hearings-An Appearance of Fairness, 5 GoNz. L. REV. 324 (1970).
196. 75 Wash. 2d at 739, 453 P.2d at 846.
197. 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
198. Id. at 298-99, 502 P.2d at 331.
199. Id. at 294, 502 P.2d at 328. At an earlier reading of the same proposal, the councilman
had voted against the amendment. Id.
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part of the councilman was sufficient cause to invalidate the amendment. 00
In overcoming the general judicial reluctance to inquire into legislative
motives2"' the court determined that it was essential that decisions involving
zoning amendments be reached fairly.202
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE VERSUS ADJUDICATIVE HURDLE
An erroneous proposition has found its way into the procedural due pro-
cess analysis. Instead of relying exclusively on the two-pronged test prescribed
by Justice Stewart in Roth,20 many courts have predicated application of
procedural due process on the nature of the forum creating the deprivation.20
Only deprivations created by an adjudicative, as opposed to a legislative body,
are subject to procedural due process requirements. This proposition rests
on the theory that the procedural aspects of legislative decision making are
relatively free from judicial inquiry0 ' and, therefore, legislatures are in effect
200. Id. at 300, 502 P.2d at 332.
201. See MCQULIN, supra note 101, at § 16.90 (instead of investigating motives, courts
usually restrict their inquiry to whether the legislature had the power to pass the act).
202. 81 Wash. 2d at 298-300, 502 P.2d at 330-31. Accord Fleck v. King County, 16 Wash.
App. 668, 558 P.2d 254, 257 (1977). For a general discussion of impartiality in zoning deci-
sions, see Kahn, supra note 175, at 1048-50.
The appearance of fairness doctrine has not garnered much support outside the zoning area.
In a recent Washington state opinion, for example, the doctrine was held inapplicable to a
quasi-legislative decision making process whereby the state's Department of Licensing adopted
a "direct supervision" rule for apprentice opticians. Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 Wash. App.
262, 623 P.2d 1164 (1981). The Somer court reasoned that, as opposed to quasi-judicial ad-
ministrative actions, quasi-legislative administrative acts provided greater protection for the in-
dividual. Such protection lay in the political process itself, rather than in "elaborate procedural
safeguards." Id. at 270, 623 P.2d at 1171.
Moreover, for all practical purposes, Chief Justice Burger ignored the neutrality requirement
in the Eastlake decision by allowing city residents to have the power to decide whether one
of their number could be deprived of his property. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 680 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
203. See supra text accompanying note 42-45.
204. Most of the cases arise out of local zoning or special tax assessment disputes. See, e.g.,
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See also Rogin v. Bensalem
Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980) (zoning board acting in legislative capacity did not
deny developer due process), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of
Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 947, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980) (cites Eastlake in con-
cluding that there was no due process violation because rezoning is a legislative matter); Cooper
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) (zoning boards are quasi-
judicial and therefore subject to due process); Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County,
96 Wash. 2d 171, 634 P.2d 862 (1981) (since zoning is legislative, inquiry limited to whether
or not acts were arbitrary and capricious). See generally Kahn, supra note 175, at 1027-28
(legislative acts are not limited by procedural due process and therefore courts will not consider
extent of protection required); Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 3, at 1508 (the
Constitution does not require that legislative action afford due process protection).
205. See, e.g., McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 40 Del. Ch. 396, 408, 183 A.2d 572, 580 (1962)
(courts will not ordinarily inquire into motives of members of a legislative body to determine
validity of ordinance enacted within the scope of their powers). See also MCQULLIN, supra
note 101, at § 15.23 (presumption is that ordinances affecting personal and property rights
are enacted in good faith unless proof to the contrary is shown).
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immune from procedural due process.2 °6 The "nature of the forum" factor
has garnered so much judicial support that it is not surprising that many
courts mistakenly have recognized it as a third prong to be added to the
Roth test.2 07
Origin of the Nature of the Forum Factor
The distinction between the legislative and the adjudicative forum and its
relevance to due process is illustrated by comparing the Supreme Court cases
of Londoner v. City and County of Denver"°8 with Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization. °9 Londoner involved a challenge by
land owners to a special assessment tax imposed by the city of Denver for
the cost of paving the street abutting their property. The tax was assessed
under provisions of the Denver City Charter, which conferred upon the city
the power to make local improvements and to assess the costs upon prop-
erty specially benefited." ' The charter authorized a process whereby a board
of public works, upon the petition of a majority of the owners of the assessed
frontage, could recommend to the city council the type of improvement re-
quested. Although the city charter assessment procedure afforded land owners
some procedural safeguards," t ' the Court ruled that the imposition of
assessments in this fashion constituted a deprivation of property without due
process of law."' Although the Court recognized that the assessment of taxes
upon property generally was a matter within the discretion of local govern-
ment, it held that the full panoply of due process protections should be pro-
vided where the state legislature delegates this responsibility to a subordinate
body." ' The Court found that the mere opportunity, afforded to the af-
fected landowners, to submit written objections and complaints did not meet
the requirements of due process."'
206. See, e.g., Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 694 (9th Cir.) ("in legislation,
or rulemaking, there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever"), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 860 (1949); State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 523, 179
A. 116, 126 (1935) (legislative functions do not require notice of hearing).
207. See, e.g., Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Thompson,
the D.C. Circuit, after examining Supreme Court precedent, concluded that the existence and
extent of due process procedural requirements turn upon consideration of three factors. Two
of these factors closely resembled the two prongs-in the Roth test. The third factor, according
to the court, was "the nature of the forum through which the Government acts." Id. at 634.
208. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
209. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
210. 210 U.S. at 375.
211. The charter called for notice by publication both before and after the improvement
to inform landowners of the assessment upon their property. The charter also allowed for the
filing of written objections with the city clerk. Id. at 376-77. Although the plaintiffs' objec-
tions were proper and timely, the city council nevertheless enacted an ordinance approving
the proposed assessments. Id. at 377.
212. Id. at 386.
213. Id. at 385-86.
214. Id. at 386.
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Bi-Metallic involved a suit to enjoin the Colorado Board of Equalization
from enforcing an order to increase the value of all taxable property in
Denver by forty percent. Taxpayers brought suit on the ground that they
were given no opportunity to be heard before the increase came into effect
and, consequently, were deprived of their property without due process of
law.2" Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, found that when
such broad legislative decisions were involved, no procedural due process,
in its traditional form of notice and hearing, need be provided. ' 6 Accord-
ing to Holmes, "[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption." '' Holmes distinguished Londoner, reasoning that the decision
therein was made by a local adjudicative board and involved specific, in-
dividualized issues concerning a relatively small number of persons."'
Read together, these two decisions create a dichotomy, for procedural due
process purposes, between adjudicative and legislative decisions. Procedural
due process is necessary for the former, not for the latter. The theories offered
for making this dichotomy typically fall into two related categories: the
separation of powers theory and the democratic system theory.
The separation of powers theory is premised on the notion that because
legislating entails political compromise and ad hoc decision making, policies
that approximate a fair and equitable distribution of both social resources
and obligations necessarily will result. 9 Legislation typically applies to a
large number of citizens within the jurisdictional authority of the legislative
body. In contrast, decisions involving individualized issues are made by the
judicial branch of government. Those who support the separation of powers
theory assert that affording individual due process protection to the large
number of citizens affected by legislation would be costly, inefficient, and
impracticable." 0
According to the democratic system theory, the traditional safeguards
of procedural due process are unnecessary in the legislative setting because
a comparable substitute exists: the voting power of the electorate. 2 ' Since
legislators are ultimately responsible to the electorate for their actions, 2 pro-
215. 239 U.S. at 442.
216. Id. at 445.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 445-46.
219. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1029 (1981). See also Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Com-
plimentary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REV. 753, 778 (1976)
(presumption that legislative action is constitutional is based on theory that such action has
broad impact, is highly visible, and can be corrected at the polls) [hereinafter cited as Booth].
220. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
221. Id. See also Comment, Due Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rule-
making, 63 CA.IF. L. REV. 886, 889 (1975) (legislatures not required to provide procedural
due process requirements because theoretically they respond to the will of the people) [hereinafter
cited as Due Process Rights].
222. Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197 (1933).
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ponents of the democratic system theory believe that public pressure will
prevent legislators from wrongfully abridging the interests of individual
citizens. 2 3
In light of the two foregoing theories, many courts and commentators
have attempted to create workable methods for distinguishing between ad-
judication and legislation for due process purposes. The approach attributed
to Justice Holmes examines the number of people that will be affected by
a pending decision.22 If the decision involved applies to only a small number
of "exceptionally affected" people, the act is adjudicative and, therefore,
subject to procedural due process requirements.22 Conversely, procedural
due process is not applicable to legislative acts which affect many
individuals.22 ' The problem with this result-oriented approach is Holmes' lack
of specificity as to what constitutes a sufficient number of people to preclude
due process.227
A rather simplistic approach, stemming, perhaps, from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Southern Railway Co. v. Virginia,22 distinguishes between ad-
judicative and legislative decision making on the basis of traditional separa-
tion of powers labels. For example, all decisions made by administrative,
executive, or judicial bodies are considered "adjudicative"; in contrast, deci-
sions made by city councils or state legislatures are viewed as "legislative"
in nature. 2 9 Due process is unnecessary for the latter group because "the
legislature acts upon adequate knowledge after full consideration and through
members who represent the entire public.""23 The trouble with this rigid label-
ing approach is that it is insensitive to the realities underlying the actual
decisions. Quite often legislatures will engage in activities that more closely
resemble adjudicatory hearings than traditional legislative decision making.3 '
Similarly, judicial bodies often participate in activities characteristic of the
legislative branch of government.232 Moreover, this approach permits the
availability of procedural rights to turn upon the allocation of power among
local legislatures, agencies and other governmental bodies-an allocation
223. See Due Process Rights, supra note 221, at 889.
224. See Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445; supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
225. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 446.
226. Id. at 445.
227. The fact that Justice Holmes dissented, without an opinion, in Londoner, 210 U.S.
at 386 (Holmes, J., dissenting)-thereby voting for no due process in a case involving a small
number of persons-makes his approach even more confusing.
228. 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
229. See Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1981).
230. Southern Ry., 290 U.S. at 197.
231. See, e.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (legislative contempt proceeding); Fasano
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (zoning ordinance amendment
proceeding).
232. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971) (local court rule uncondi-
tionally forbidding attorneys from making extrajudicial comments on pending cases viewed as
"legislative" in nature and subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as statutes restricting
free speech).
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determined by political expediency and administrative efficiency rather than
by the fundamental interest underlying due process.233
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, renowned for his attempts to distinguish
between legislative and adjudicative decision making, suggests making an
assessment of the kinds of facts involved in the decision making process
before determining whether procedural due process is mandated."" Facts that
concern questions of policy and law are deemed to be legislative facts.2",
Because decisions based on these kinds of facts are "legislative" in nature,
they are not subject to due process.2"6 Davis asserts, however, that due pro-
cess is required when the facts to be evaluated in the decision making pro-
cess wholly concern the immediate parties to a controversy. In such cir-
cumstances, no decision should be made without affording the parties various
due process protections.237
Although the Davis approach has been widely followed, 8 it nevertheless
is flawed. Davis' analysis does not differ significantly from the two ap-
proaches discussed above. 3 ' Notwithstanding that the framework Davis sets
out goes beyond the simple labeling technique utilized in Southern Railway,
Davis' approach is susceptible to such semantic manipulation that courts can
use it to achieve the result desired in a particular situation."" Consequently,
the Davis approach merely provides courts with an arsenal of words and
phrases with which to justify decisions.
233. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510.
234. K. DAVIS, ADINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The rationale Davis offers for this proposition is that adjudicative facts are "intrin-
sically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the parties
a chance to know and meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them." Id. Davis cites
the 1955 Supreme Court case of Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955), as support
for his proposition. The Court therein distinguished certain cases on the ground that "they
do not involve individualized fact finding and classification, but legislative determinations, political
judgments, and the exercise of judicial discretion. 348 U.S. at 413, quoted in, DAVIS,
supra note 223, at § 7.02.
238. See, e.g., Nolan v. Ramsey, 597 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff unsuccessfully challeng-
ed legislative policy decision to employ new stenographic methods); Lakey v. Richardson, 527
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975) (prisoner entitled to hearing when adjudicative facts of his custody
classification are at issue); Jackson County Public Water Supply Dist. No. 2 v. State Highway
Comm'n, 365 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1963) (decision whether to assess cost of moving water lines
in state highway to state or property owner is legislative in nature).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 218-27 for a discussion of the separation of powers
theory and the democratic system theory. According to Professor Nathaniel Nathanson: "[in
actual application [Professor Davis' approach] is as elusive as all the other magic keys which
have been offered for the solution of the right to hearing problem." Nathanson, Book Review,
70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211 (1961).
240. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 503-04 (1970)
(discussing Transcontinental Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962)) [hereinafter
cited as Robinson].
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The Adjudicative-Versus-Legislative Issue as a Third-Prong
to the Roth Due Process Analysis
As a result of the continued reliance on the legislative-adjudicative
dichotomy, courts typically permit their determination of the type of forum
involved to control the entire due process question, notwithstanding the out-
come reached in prong-one of the Roth test. In other words, if a Court
finds that a "legislative" forum is involved, no process will be due, despite
the fact that a valid constitutionally protected interest is found to be at
stake.2""
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,2"" the Court asserted
that its characterization of a municipal zoning procedure as "legislative"
controlled the procedural due process issue. Despite the fact that resident
property interests were at stake and the zoning procedures might have pro-
vided inadequate protection against capricious governmental deprivation, the
majority concluded that the "legislative" nature of the zoning ordinance meant
that due process was satisfied."" Similarily, in New Motor Vehicle Board
v. Fox,2""' the Supreme Court held that the California Automobiles Fran-
chise Act (Act) did not violate procedural due process by requiring motor
vehicle manufacturers to secure the approval of the California New Motor
Vehicle Board (Board) before opening a retail dealership within the market
area of an existing fanchisee, if the latter protests.2 5 Although the Act
directed the Board to notify the manufacturer of the statutory requirement
if and when an existing franchisee filed a protest, it did not require the
Board to hold a hearing on the merits of the protest before sending notice
to the manufacturer. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, characterized
the provisions of the Act as reflecting "general legislative policy. '"' Bren-
nan concluded that even if the right to franchise was a protected interest,
legislatures are constitutionally empowered to enact business regulations that
impose reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of such rights.24 7
241. The following passage from a Louisiana Supreme Court decision illustrates this procedure:
A determination of the applicability of the requirements of procedural due process
to the administative process is generally based upon the distinction between legislative
and judicial functions. If the activity of the administrative body tends to assimilate
the exercise of the legislative function, then procedural due process is not demand-
ed since no such limitation is placed upon the legislature itself. If however, a judicial
function is involved, an analogy to judicial process is made, and the procedural
safeguards developed in the administration of justice must be observed.
Tafaro's Inv. Co. v. Division of Hous. Improvement, 261 La. 183, 186, 259 So. 2d 57, 60
(1972) (emphasis added).
242. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 126-33 for a discussion of
Eastlake.
243. 426 U.S. at 677.
244. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
245. Id. at 108.
246. Id. at 105-06.
247. Id. Justice Brennan cited Bi-Metallic as support for his conclusion that legislative policy
is not subject to procedural due process. Id. at 108.
1982]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Fox, recognized the unfairness involved
in allowing a legislative label to preclude imposition of due process protec-
tions. According to Stevens, the statute, in providing existing franchisees
unfettered discretion to restrain the liberty of new competitors, "blatantly
offends the principles of fair notice, attention to the merits, and neutral
dispute resolution that inform the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.""'
The Fifth Circuit recently allowed the characterization of a zoning act
as legislative to be determinative of a procedural due process issue. In Couf
v. DeBlaker, 249 the City Commission of Clearwater, Florida had instructed
the city planning department to "down zone' 25 0 all property within 500 feet
of the city's waterfront, thereby preventing the plaintiff from building a con-
dominium on his property. The Fifth Circuit observed that because its prior
opinions "repeatedly characterize[d] local zoning decisions as legislative in
nature, '2 1' plaintiff could not claim that his due process rights had been
abridged, notwithstanding the deprivation of plaintiffs property interest.2 12
The Case Against the Legislative-Adjudicative Distinction ofa
Third-prong to the Roth Due Process Analysis
Given that procedural due process provides fairness, justice, and order
and prevents arbitrary and mistaken deprivation of constitutionally protected
248. Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also noted:
The Court places great store in the fact that the California legislature, rather than
some administrative or adjudicative body, stands behind the deprivation at issue
in this case. But . . . a legislative adjudication of power to private citizens who
are prone to act arbitrarily is no less unconstitutional than the arbitrary exercise
of that power by the state officials themselves.
Id. at 126 n.30.
249. 652 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1981).
250. The term "down zone" was defined by the court to mean "the reduction of the number
of building units which may be constructed in a given area." Id. at 586 n.l.
251. Id. at 590 (citing Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1196 (5th Cir. 1981)).
See South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837 (1974); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1974).
252. Couf, 652 F.2d at 590. The legislative-adjudicative dichotomy also has been utilized
by many state courts. In the 1979 case of Horn v. Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134,
156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979), for example, the California Supreme Court ruled that a local ad-
ministrative agency's approval of a tentative subdivision map was "adjudicative" in nature.
Id. at 614, 596 P.2d at 1138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722. Therefore, the agency was required to
provide various due process protections before any deprivation of property occurred. Id. at
616, 596 P.2d at 1140, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
One year later, in Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565,
169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that due process was not offend-
ed by a local ordinance that made rezoning of property contingent upon approval by public
referendum. Unlike the subdivision approval process in Horn, the Arnel court characterized
the referendum measure as legislative in nature. Consequently, the court emphasized that despite
the significant property interests implicated by the rezoning procedures, no due process viola-
tions had occurred. Id. at 517, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
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interests, " ' it is paradoxical to allow certain governmental acts affecting pro-
tected interests to be automatically excluded from the dictates of the due
process clause. The legislative label, however defined, effectively permits
legislatures to enjoy absolute immunity from procedural due process. This
infirmity in American jurisprudence, buoyed by both the "democratic system
theory"25 ' and the "separation of powers theory,"2 " ' seems to ignore cer-
tain realities of the modern world.
First, there is growing awareness that legislators often succumb to pressures
placed upon them by private economic interests.5 It is unrealistic to believe
that review by the electorate will justify or rectify every legislative depriva-
tion. The problem is particularly acute when the issue before the legislature
concerns only one segment of the population represented by the legislative
body. As one commentator observed, "[m]ost voters are unaware or un-
concerned that individual rights may have been sacrificed in the procedural
informality which accompanies action deemed to be legislative." '257 In sum,
the contemporary democratic process simply is not capable of adequately
protecting the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process clause.
Moreover, it is no longer impracticable to afford procedural due process
in the legislative setting. The increased size, capabilities, and expertise of
legislative staffs have enabled legislators to conduct additional hearings
together and disseminate data.2" In addition, technological advances within
the electronic broadcasting mediums have allowed for the widespread, live
coverage of legislative sessions and hearings.259 Such coverage, which is cer-
tain to increase as the cable television market expands, has invited mass public
participation in the legislative process. In sum, legislative bodies are perfect-
ly capable of providing the bare rudiments of procedural due process. 6
253. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15 for a discussion of the functions of procedural
due process.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.
256. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 588, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973). See
also Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 Ill. 2d 415, 424, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1962) (Klingbiel,
J., concurring) ("[tlo place [certain zoning decisions] in the hands of legislative bodies, whose
acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary govern-
ment"); Satter, Changing Rules of Courts and Legislatures, 11 CONN. L. REV. 230, 244 (1979)
(examples of legislators passing a law under pressure by special interest groups).
257. Booth, supra note 219, at 778.
258. L. DODD & R. SCHATT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 194-95 (1979). See
also W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (5th ed. 1981) (general discus-
sion of the increased legislative efficiency resulting from specialized investigatory committees
regarding certain legislation).
259. See Stein, Box Populi: Report from Television Land, 3 PuB. OPINION 18 (1978); CON-
GRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., INSIDE CONGRESS 147-49 (2d ed. 1979).
260. Professor Robert Hamilton, in an article based on a report he made to the Administrative
Conference of the United States in 1972, discussed in great detail the feasibility of imposing
procedural safeguards on the legislative process. See Hamilton, Procedures For the Adoption
of Rules Of General Applicability: The Need For Procedural Innovation In Administrative
Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972). After noting initially that full-scale trial-type for-
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In Groppi v. Leslie,2 for example, the Supreme Court determined that
while a state legislature, in conducting a legislative contempt proceeding, might
not be obligated to conduct a full-scale trial, it nevertheless should provide
defendant reasonable notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard
before punishment was imposed.262 Similarly, in Powelton Civic Home
Owners' Association v. Department of HUD,2 63 residents of an area affected
by a proposed urban renewal project challenged the procedures followed by
the federal government in determining the funds to be distributed to the
project. Initially, the district court determined that the government's deci-
sions involved legislative facts; thus, the residents had no right to an ad-
judicatory hearing.2 6' Nevertheless, the court concluded that it would not
be unreasonable to afford the residents an opportunity to submit written
and documentary evidence. 65
The Second Circuit took similar action in Burr v. New Rochell Municipal Hous-
ingAuthority. 16 There, a municipal housing authority imposed a service charge
of two dollars a month on all tenants. This charge was imposed without
notice or a public hearing. Because the court found the authority's action
to be legislative in nature, no adversary hearing was required.26 Yet, the
Court held that the authority nevertheless should provide minimal procedural
safeguards such as notice of rent increases and an opportunity to file writ-
ten objections. 6'
The increased ability of modern legislatures to provide at least minimal
procedural due process safeguards also is reflected in the recently approved
Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 69 For example, one section of
the Model Act specifies the procedure to be followed for public participa-
tion in legislative rulemaking.7 0 While the Model Act falls short of making
mal hearings often "tended to be drawn out, repetitious, and unproductive." Id. at 1287, Pro-
fessor Hamilton set out numerous procedural safeguards that could adequately be employed
in the rulemaking setting. Id. at 1330-36. See also Robinson, supra note 240, at 525-26 (strong
argument against the generalization thai legislative bodies are unable to provide procedural
safeguards).
261. 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
262. Id. at 502-03. Cf. McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (in proceeding
to expel a member, legislature must provide basic due process requirements such as adequate
notice, formal charges, hearing before full senate and opportunity to present evidence and receive
a transcript).
263. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
264. Id. at 830.
265. Id. at 835.
266. 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973).
267. Id. at 1169.
268. Id. at 1170.
269. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 14 U.L.A. 371 (1981).
270. Id. § 3-104 [Public Participation]. The section provides as follows:
(a) For at least [30] days after publication of the notice of proposed rule adop-
tion, an agency shall afford persons the opportunity to submit in writing, argu-
ment, data, and views on the proposed rule.
(b)(l) An agency shall schedule an oral proceeding on a proposed rule if, within
[20] days after the published notice or proposed rule adoption, a written request
for an oral proceeding is submitted by [the administrative rules review committee],
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trial-type hearings an absolute requirement,2"' it nevertheless recognizes that
legislative bodies are capable of providing procedural safeguards such as
published notice of proposed rule adoptions or public proceedings.
Recently, there has been a movement toward requiring legislatures to pro-
vide due process protections in the land use and zoning area.2"2 The leading
case in this breakthrough is Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners.2"
There, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the traditionally "legisla-
tive" county zoning process was a "quasi-judicial" act, subject to the full
panoply of due process safegurds.274 In so doing, the Oregon court effec-
tively removed automatic legislative immunity from the procedural due pro-
cess analysis.27 Similarly, in Fleming v. City of Tacoma,276 the Supreme
[the administrative rules counsel], a political subdivision, an agency, or [25] per-
sons. At that proceeding, persons may present oral argument, data, and views on
the proposed rule.
(2) An oral proceeding on a proposed rule, if required, may not be held earlier
than [20] days after notice of its location and time is published in the [administrative
bulletin].
(3) The agency, a member of the agency, or another presiding officer designated
by the agency shall preside at a required oral proceeding on a proposed rule. If
the agency does not preside, the presiding official shall prepare a memorandum
for consideration by the agency summarizing the contents of the presentations made
at the oral proceeding. Oral proceedings must be open to the public and be record-
ed by stenographic or other means.
(4) Each agency shall issue rules for the conduct of oral rule-making proceedings.
Those rules may include provisions calculated to prevent undue repetition in the
oral proceedings.
Id.
271. In the Commissioners' Comment following § 3-104, it is specifically noted that it would
be undesirable to require a trial-type hearing on most rules of general applicability. Id.
272. See Kahn, supra note 175, at 1030 n.105 and cases cited therein; Wolfstone, The Case
for a Procedural Due Process Limitation on the Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake Revisited,
7 Ecoioov L.Q. 51, 83-84 (1978). See also Booth, supra note 219, at 777-79 (theory that legislative
decisions of a consistently ad hoc nature can be considered judicial for due process purposes).
273. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
274. 1d. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. According to the Fasano court, the following procedural
safeguards must be afforded by the local legislature when it engages in zoning amendment
decisions:
Parties at the hearing before the county governing body are entitled to an oppor-
tunity to be heard, to an opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal
which is impartial in the matter-i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte con-
tacts concerning the question at issue-and to a record made and adequate findings
executed.
Id. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30.
275. See Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process Before
Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 50, 59-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Sullivan]. Unfortunately, the Oregon Supreme Court has failed to follow its own lead with
respect to procedural due process issues outside the area of zoning. See, e.g., Western Amuse-
ment Co. v. City of Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 42, 545 P.2d 595, 594 (1976) (imposition of a
special assessment tax is the exercise of a legislative function and, as such, is subject to limited
judicial review).
276. 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 197-202
for a discussion of Fleming.
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Court of Washington imposed procedural constraints on municipal legislative
bodies engaged in certain zoning decisions.277
Although both Fasano and Fleming recognize the existence of the legislative-
administrative dichotomy," 8 the rationale proffered by the two cases for
making the distinction is less protective of the legislative process than any
approach previously developed. In Fasano, for example, the Oregon court
considered the following three elements in making the distinction: (1) the
party initiating the change; (2) the size of the parcel affected; and (3) the
number of affected owners and the diversity of their interests.27 9 The Model
Land Development Code '80 adopted a standard for legislative authorization
of special amendments to zoning codes that is remarkably similar to the
one established in Fasano.281 ' As one commentator observed, Fasano and the
Model Land Development Code exemplify the basic trend of increased em-
phasis on procedural fairness in land use law.28 '
277. 81 Wash. 2d at 298-99, 502 P.2d at 311 (application of appearance of fairness doctrine).
278. See Fasano, 264 Or. at 579-81, 507 P.2d at 25-27; Fleming, 81 Wash. 2d at 298, 502
P.2d at 331.
279. 264 Or. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. See Kahn, supra note 175, at 1032. The Fasano test
was recently applied in another zoning case by the Oregon Supreme Court in South of Sun-
nyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063, 1071 n.5 (1977).
The Washington Supreme Court in Fleming was less specific than Oregon's Supreme Court,
requiring only that all decisions, regardless of their classification as legislative or adjudicative,
be "arrived at fairly." 81 Wash. 2d at 298-99, 502 P.2d at 331.
280. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-312 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL CODE].
281. Id. Section 2-312 of the Model Land Development Code provides, inter alia, as follows:
(2) Prior to the adoption of a special amendment, the Land Development Agency
shall hold a hearing . . . and make findings and recommendations on the issues
presented in regard to the proposed amendment. A special amendment may only
be adopted if (a) development at the proposed location is essential or especially
appropriate in view of the available alternatives within or without the jurisdiction.
Compare id. with supra note 274.
282. Sullivan, supra note 275, at 71. However, a number of jurisdictions strictly adhering
to the superficial legislative-adjudicative dichotomy have rejected the rationale of the Fasano
and Tacoma decisions. See Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d
467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977) (since the zoning of property is a legislative function, the city
council, in deciding a rezoning request, is not required to make express findings of fact); Hall
Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (County Board of Commis-
sioners was not required to enter findings and conclusions justifying its decision to rezone cer-
tain property).
Yet, the net result of Fasano is to increase substantially the number of legislative actions
subject to procedural due process. Sullivan, supra note 275, at 68. Sullivan notes that "to
appreciate the significance of the Fasano decision, an analysis of its impact on the land use
regulatory process is necessary." Id. Accordingly, Sullivan discusses in detail the local legislature's
ability to provide such procedural safeguards as notice and an opportunity to be heard, an
impartial tribunal, an opportunity to present and rebut evidence, and the making of an ade-
quate record for review. Id. at 68-71.
In general, Sullivan concludes that the imposition of such requirements will not be problematic,
with the possible exception of providing cross-examination for all those affected. As a solu-
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Although no court has expressly called for the elimination of the
adjudicative-legislative distinction, the overall effect of cases such as Fasano
and Fleming is to pierce the superficial veil that has been placed over the
legislative process. The next logical step is to remove the veil altogether and
allow proper application of the due process clause. Even assuming that the
theories underlying the legislative-adjudicative dichotomy are valid, use of
the dichotomy is nevertheless inappropriate for practical reasons. As observed
earlier," 3 courts and commentators have failed to develop any workable,
nonarbitrary method for distinguishing between legislative functions and ad-
jpdicative functions for due process purposes. Therefore, courts would be
doing themselves a great service by eliminating the need to make such a
distinction.
This is not to say that legislative bodies should always provide the full
panoply of procedural due process safeguards. Such a requirement would
be both impracticable and inappropriate. Instead, the exact procedure re-
quired would be determined under the second prong of the Roth analysis. 2 4
As previously noted, due process is a flexible concept.2"' The Supreme
Court has devised a practical and useful balancing test286 for determining
the type and the extent of the process that is due under different circum-
stances. Thus, by using Roth's second prong,287 courts may logically calculate
the appropriateness of providing due process protections when deprivation
has resulted from legislative action.
The dynamics of this proposition are best illustrated through considera-
tion of the following two hypothetical cases. Both cases take place in a city
with a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000 and with a city council
form of government composed of twenty-five members:
tion, Sullivan suggests "allowing an individual a degree of procedural rights based on the extent
of his interest in the outcome of the hearings. Thus, while all would be allowed to exercise
their rights to 'testify' at land-use hearings, only those accorded 'party' status should be able
to cross-examine." Id. at 70.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 230-40.
284. This approach was proposed by James R. Kahn. See Kahn, supra note 175. The thrust
of Mr. Kahn's proposal, which initially calls for the elimination of the legislative-adjudicative
distinction as a third prong, is illustrated by the following passage from his recent Hastings article:
[1]t is suggested that there be no threshold distinction [between legislative and
adjudicative] at all. As the first half of the Roth test eliminates only de minimis
interests, allowing the second step, balancing, to properly allocate lesser procedures
to smaller interests, the legislative-adjudicative distinction should be used to wholly
deny due process protection only to what might be called "de maximis" interests-
those laws passed by state legislatures and Congress. Acts by local legislatures
and commissions would be subject to due process protection, though limited by
a legislative-adjudicative sliding scale of concerns-that is, those concerns outlined
above-employed as part of the Roth balancing test.
Id. at 1033-34 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Kahn limits his proposal to the decision making pro-
cedure in the area of municipal land-use planning and zoning. There is no reason, however,
why this approach cannot be extended to encompass all governmental decision making.
285. See supra text accompanying note 112.
286. See supra text accompanying note 114.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
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Hypothetical A
A construction company owns a parcel of real property in an unpopulated
and remote section of the city. Since enactment of the City Zoning Code
twenty years ago, the parcel has been exclusively zoned for residential use.
The company properly applies to the city council for rezoning of the prop-
erty for industrial use so as to permit the operation of a rock quarry.
The city council, without conducting a hearing or making any specific find-
ings of fact concerning the company's need for the rezoning, denies the
rezoning application. The company files a lawsuit alleging deprivation of
property without procedural due process.2"
Hypothetical B
The city council, in an effort to rejuvenate and attract visitors to the
downtown area, orders construction of a major off-street enclosed park-
ing facility on city owned land in the center of town. To pay for the facility,
a special assessment is levied on all property within a designated area sur-
rounding the proposed facility. No prior notice or hearing regarding the
assessment is given. The property owners within the assessment district
file a lawsuit alleging deprivation of property without procedural due
process."'
Suppose that in both of the above hypotheticals, the court, after properly
conducting the analysis required by the first prong of the Roth test, deter-
mines that petitioners have been deprived of a legitimate property interest.
Under the Roth analysis, the second prong requires determination of "what
process is due." This determination should be made regardless of the fact
that in both hypotheticals the deprivation was made by a legislative body
or involved legislative facts. The court then has the opportunity to examine
the ability of the city council to provide procedural due process in light of
the specific facts of each case. It can balance the particular interests of the
property owners against the fiscal and administrative burden on the city coun-
cil caused by imposition of any procedural safeguards. For example, in
Hypothetical A, the court can weigh the value of a hearing and fact finding
process to the construction company against the feasibility and practicality
of the city council to engage in such activity. Notwithstanding its conclu-
sions in the first hypothetical case, the court can engage in a similar, yet
entirely separate, balancing process under the facts of Hypothetical B. The
court may very well find that a full-scale formal hearing is necessary in
Hypothetical A but, in light of the large number of petitioners involved,
288. The following cases involve factual situations analogous to the hypothetical: Hall Paving
Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226 S.E.2d 728 (1976); Hawkins v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 266 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1954); Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974); Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough
of Paramus, 34 N.J. 406, 169 A.2d 814 (1961).
289. The following cases present factual situations analogous to this hypothetical: Kissane
v. City of Anchorage, 159 F. Supp. 773 (D. Alaska 1958); Crampton v. City of Royal Oak,
362 Mich. 503, 108 N.W.2d 16 (1961); Patterson v. City of Bismark, 212 N.W.2d 374 (N.D.
1973); Northern Pac. Ry. v. City of Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1955); Wing v. City
of Eugene, 249 Or. 367, 437 P.2d 836 (1968).
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merely an opportunity to submit written objections is necessary in
Hypothetical B. In either case, the court would have conducted a complete
and fair analysis instead of arbitrarily concluding at the outset that no pro-
cess is due simply because legislative facts are involved.
The proposal to eliminate the adjudicative-legislative dichotomy as a third
prong in the procedural due process analysis is not without drawbacks. It
is conceivable that, in certain instances, the only impact of this approach
may be pro forma. In other words, the merging of the adjudicative-legislative
prong into the second prong of the balancing test often may do nothing
more than change the point at which a court determines that procedural
due process is unnecessary for governmental actions. Moreover, if due pro-
cess is required for legislative actions, the extra cost and burden of holding
hearings and making records ultimately will be borne by the general public,
the very persons sought to be protected by procedural due process.
While each of the foregoing criticisms is reasonable, the problems created
by. eliminating the adjudicative-legislative dichotomy are not insurmountable.
This is especially true when those criticisms are examined in light of the
overall benefits to be achieved by this proposal. The extinction of the
legislative-adjudicative dichotomy as a separate prong of the Roth analysis
will remove the shield protecting federal, state, and local legislative bodies
from compliance with due process guarantees. Less arbitrary, more respon-
sible legislative decisions can only result.
CONCLUSION
Individuals are afforded procedural due process to protect their constitu-
tional interests from arbitrary and capricious governmental deprivation. In
response to increasing confusion surrounding the applicability of the due
process concept, the Supreme Court, in Roth, developed a systematic, two-
pronged analytical framework for resolving procedural due process issues.
Yet, notwithstanding this straightforward analysis, there is widespread
misunderstanding regarding the degree of deference that should be accorded
state and local decision making.
Moreover, a judicially created doctrine has evolved which predicates
applicability of procedural due process on a distinction between legislative
and adjudicative forums. This entirely arbitrary dichotomy should not be
used as an additional prong of the procedural due process test developed
in Roth. The theories behind the dichotomy are outdated and implausible.
Additionally, the methods for making the dichotomy are flawed and un-
workable. Finally, any valid distinctions, for procedural due process pur-
poses, between legislative and adjudicative forums can be resolved by the
balancing process used in the second prong of the Roth test. Therefore, no
valid reason exists for courts, in resolving procedural due process issues,
to deviate from the sound and practical two-prong test developed in Roth.
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